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During the early 1980s, objective minimum capital-
to-asset ratio requirements replaced the earlier peer
group type ofcapital regulation. This empiricalstudy
ofthe effectson the capital positionsofthe 100largest
BHCsfinds that the regulations succeeded in causing
banks with lowcapitalratiosto increase theirbookvalue
capital ratios both absolutely and relativeto banks with
initially high capital ratios, and that the banks did so
primarily by slowing asset growth.
However, evidence on changes in market valuecapi-
tal ratios, while not necessarily inconsistent with the
apparent book value capital increase inducedby regu-
independentsupportto the ideathat
regulation caused an actual increase in capital ratios.
As guarantor ofa largeportionofbank deposits,
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has a
strong interestin ensuring thatbanks maintain adequate
capital. serves two purposes: it
exposure of the insurance fund to bank and it
limits banks' incentivesto take excessive risks. Pursuant
to this interest, the FDICand the otherbanking regula-
tory agencies (the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency and the Federal Reserve)try to influence bank
capital through supervision and regulation.
Priorto the 1980s, subjectivecapital standards, based
on the results ofthe regulatory agencies' examinations
of individual banking organizations, werethe main form
of capital regulation. Typically, regulators compared
capital-to-asset ratios for bank peer groups (banks
grouped by common characteristics Such as asset
size) and tried to ensure that banks with capital
ratios lowerthantheir peer group's average raised their
capital ratios.
Largely because of the heightened concern over the
risk exposure of the insurance system during the 1980s,
the peer group type of capital regulation was replaced
by specific minimum requirements. The risk exposure
wasincreasing, it wasbelieved,because of deteriorating
asset quality, increases in off-balance sheet activity and
declining capital ratios. The new capital requirements
were intended to deal with these problems by causing
banks withlowcapitalratios to increasethem. Moreover,
there was a desire to bring about more uniformity and
objectivity in capital regulation. Consistent with these
objectives, all banks and bank holding companies were
required to hold primary capital at least equal to 5.5
percent of assets by June 1985.
There has been considerable debate overwhether cap-
ital regulation is effective - specifically, whether regu-
lators havesucceeded incausing capital-deficient banks
to increase their capital ratios. In the seminal paper on
this subject, Peltzman (1970), using data from the 1963-
1967 period, found no evidencethat regulation affected
banks' capital ratios. Although a later study by Mingo
(1975), that examined the 1969-1970 period, seemed to
find evidence of an effect, Dietrich and James (1973)
argue that Mingo's findings were due to a failure to
account for the effects of Regulation Q (deposit-rate
ceilings) on banks' capital decisions.
3In particular, during the 1969-1970period analyzed
by Mingo, banks were not permitted to raise interest
payments to market-clearing levels even on large,
uninsured deposits. As a result, banks may haveboosted
their capital ratios, therebymaking their deposits safer
and raisingtheexpected yield, to compete for uninsured
deposits. Consistent with this hypothesis, Dietrich and
James find noevidence that capitalregulation affected
capital ratios during the 1971-1975 period when ceilings
on most large deposits were not binding.1
This paper contributes to the literature on the effec-
nveness of capital H;;;oUlaU~}Hby examining
took place in the 1980s. In many ways, this recent
periodisideal for such a study becauseof the exogenous,
explicit, andsweepingnature of those changes in capital
regulation.
As in the previous literature, this study examines
whether the new capital requirements caused banks with
capital ratios below the minimum to raise their book
value capitalratiosto meet the newstandards. However,
unlike previous studies, this studyalso analyzes whether
observed increases in book value capital represent an
actual, market value capital infusion or whether they
merelyresult from accounting changes. Toaddress these
questions, I examine, first, changes in banks'bookvalue
capital ratios causedby regulation; second, the sources
of thosechanges; andthird, the effects on market value
capital-to-asset ratios using a measure based on stock
prices.
The issue ofwhether a marketvalue capital infusion
took place is particularlyimportant in judgingthe effec-
tiveness of the capital regulations because the risk
exposure of the insurance fund depends on the market
values of banks' assets and liabilities - not their book
values. For example, when a bank fails andis liquidated
by the FDIC, the FDIC's loss equals the bank's liabili-
ties minus the market value of its assets.
However, only book value capital-to-asset ratios-
that is, ratios calculated using historical accounting
values - are subject to regulation, and, there need
not be a close correspondence between book and
market values. For example, banks might respond to
more stringent capital regulation by selling and then
repurchasing appreciated assets. This would have the
effect of increasingbookvalue capitalandassets by the
amount of the capital gain and thereby increasing the
book valuecapital-to-asset ratio, butit would not affect
the market value ratio or the risk exposure of the deposit
insurance system.
Even if thecapitalregulations of the 1980ssucceeded
in causing at least some banks to bolster their capital-
to-asset ratios as my analysis suggests, a second related
and importantquestion remains: Did those banks that
4
increased their capital ratios in response to the regula-
tions react by increasing the asset risk oftheir portfo-
lios in aneffortto maintaina given rate ofreturn? This
questionisaddressed in an upcomingarticle in.the Sum-
mer Review (Furlong, 1988). This issue is important
because increased asset risk, potentiallyatleast, could
offset the beneficial effects ofhigher capital ratios'on
reducing the risk exposure of the deposit insurance
system.
This paperisorganized as follows. In Section I, I exa-
mine the effects of the capital regulations on bookvalue
capital I cap-
ital ratios did increase their ratiosto meet stand-
ards introduced in the 1980s, apparently in response
to the regulations. Therefore, it appears as though
capital regulation is effective on average, at least a
book value sense.
Section II analyzes how the increase in book value
capital was accomplished in order to assess whether it
was the result of a true reduction in leverage or simply
the result of accounting changes. The evidence indicates
that banks increased their book value capital ratios
mainly by slowing asset growth. This suggests that an
actual increase in capital ratios did take place.
Section III thenexamines the effects on marketvalue
capital ratios to see if they are consistent with this
interpretation. Although the patterns of changes in
stock-price-based measures of market value capital
ratios are consistent with an increase in actual capital
under certain assumptions, they are consistent with
several other hypotheses as well. Finally, Section IV
presents a summary and conclusions.I. Effects on Book-Value Capital Ratios
This Section analyzes whether the 1981-1985 capital
regulations caused banks with capital below the mini-
mum levels to raise (book value) capital, and thus
whether the regulations reduced the disparity in capital
ratios as intended. A briefdescription of the regulations
is presented, after which their effects are analyzed.
Bank Capital Regulation: 1981-1985
In December of 1981, in a sharp departure from the
federal agencies specific
minimum capital standards. With the exception of the
17largest banking organizations - the multinationals -
minimum primarycapital was set at 6 percent ofassets
for banks and bank holding companies with assets less
than $1 billion, and 5 percent for organizations with
assets of $1 billion or more.?
One of the stated purposes of this regulation was
"...(to) address the sizable existing disparity in capital
ratios among banking organizations of different size.'"
However, at the time the regulation was promulgated,
actual differences in capital ratios were taken into
account and the (trichotomous) capital standards
apparently were set so that most organizations would
meet the minimums.
Although the multinationals had very low capital
levels and initially were exempted from the explicit
minimum requirements for banks with assets over $1
billion (requirements which almostnoneof themwould
have met),4 the agencies announced that their policies
with respect to the multinationals would be amended
"...(to) insure that appropriate steps are taken to
improve over time the capital positions of banking
organizations in this group.:" Consistent with this
goal, in June 1983, the 5 percent requirement was
extended to the multinationals. Moreover, reflecting
the original stated purpose of instituting objective
and uniform minimum capital standards, in June of
1985, a uniform 5.5 percent minimum primary capital
ratio was required for all banking organizations regard-
less of size.
Although a minimum primary capital ratio of 5.5
percent was set for all banks and bank holding compa-
nies (BHCs), a typical banking organization was
expected to operate abovethe minimum ratio. Moreover,
high-risk organizations wereexpected to hold evenmore
additional capital." Thus, if the regulations were effec-
tive,one would expectto seeactualprimarycapital ratios
average somewhat above the 5.5 percent level.
The evolution in capital regulation from trichotomous
to dichotomous, and finally to uniform standards is
consistent with the stated goals of the 1981 regulations -
to bring uniformityovertime in capital regulation. Thus,
one might argue thatthe 1985uniform standards were
the ultimate objective even as early as December 1981.
In keeping with this interpretation, this paper dis-
tinguishes the behavior of banks that would have met
the 1985requirements in 1981 from those thatwould not
have. Throughout the paper, I refer to the former as
the latter as capital-deficient
banks.
I also focus on primarycapital (which consists mainly
common loss ,.p",,,.,.,,,00
preferred stock) of capital includes
primary capital plus limited life preferred stock and
subordinated notes and debentures) because primary
capitalrequirements must be met in orderto meet total
capital requirements and because primary capital is
somewhat easier to measure.
Data
The data used in my study come from the quarterly
Bank Call Reports and the Compustat banktapes, which
contain balance sheet and income statements for the 150
largest bank holding companies whose stock is publicly
traded. Although this sample of 150 BHCs is not
representative ofthe entire population of all banks or
bankholding companies, whichconsists of many smaller
and often privately held banks and bank holding com-
panies as well, the BHCs in this sample hold about 40
percent of all bankassets and thus are of interest in their
own right.
The Compustat sample also is subject to selectivity
(survivor) bias since it ofbanks currently
in existence. Thus, banks that have failed or that were
acquired are not included in the sample. The exclusion
of failed or acquired banks might bias the studytoward
finding that capital regulation was effective since banks
not meeting the requirements would be more likely to
fail or be acquired and thus not be included in the
are not
able for the entire sample of 150banks. Todeal with this
second problem, I focus on a subsample of 103banks
for which data are available over the entire analysis
period. Thus, the results may only apply to a subsample
of large publicly traded banks that have not failed or
been acquired.
Effects of Regulations on Book Capital Ratios
Chart 1shows an overall downward trend until 1981
in the mean of the primary book capital ratio for a
sample of large,publiclytradedbanks overthe 1965-1986
period. This downward trend is part of a longer down-
5ward trend that began as early as 1956(see Keeleyand
Furlong, 1987).
However,the downward trend apparentlyhas reversed
since 1982, perhaps partly as a result of the imposition
of objective capital regulation in December 1981.
7 An
alternative explanationisthatsome external factor, such
as a change in the economic environment, caused
capital ratios of banksto increase on average. However,
li m o~
expectthe capital ratios of those banks initiallynot meet-
ing the requirements (that is,the capital-deficient banks)
to rise relative to those meeting them (the capital-suffi-
cient banks). Moreover, one would expect that, even-
tually, the capital ratios of two groups would
indistinguishable.
In Chart2, mean primarybookcapital-to-asset
are plotted separatelyfor and caprtar-
deficient banks. Thechart shows that capital-deficient
banks did increase their capital ratios relative to
capital-sufficient banks - a patternconsistent the
hypothesis that regulation caused the increase capital
ratios. Moreover,the increase wasgradualoverthe 1982-
1986period, which is consistent the stated goal of
the 1981 requirementsto induce capital-deficient
to augment capital over
Chart 3plots the percent of banks in each group meet-
ingthe 1985requirements over
that by 1986about 90 of
banks weremeeting the 1985 capital requirements.
it appears
tive the sense that
sample werecomplying
ments. While the increase
period might have a reaction
perceivedincrease bank
crisis)and thus wasnot
neverthelesssuggest that regulation was ".Hp"ti"".
in boosting banks'capital ratios than would
have been in its absence.
In the next part of this section, an overview some
of the keydifferencesin the characteristics of the capital-
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6Statistical of Capital Ratios
Chart 3 suggests that capital-deficient banks gradu-
adjusted capital ratios over the 1982-1986
period to eventually meet or exceed the 1985 require-
credit (SLCs).
One ofthe possible reasons the capital-deficientgroup
had lower capital ratios 1981 was that, to that
this group banks was believed to been
less risky. The group therefore would have required less
capital because larger sizeandmultinational scope
allowed for more diversified portfolios. However, the
onset of the LDC debt crisis and other economywide
shocks called for a re-evaluation. Thus, it appears
one of the major goals of the series of new capital
regulations promulgated the early 1980swasto bolster
the as wen as
capital-deticient banks
ofassets compared to $19
foreign deposits (35percent of
a fraction
savings),
!1",,,,, II" involved issuing standby letters of
thegroup ofcapital-sufficient banks isused as a control
group against the behavior of the capital-deficient
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* Banks that met 1985 requirements in 1981.
**Banks that did not meet 1985 requirements in 1981.
7ments. Table2confirms this with a comparisonof mean
primary book capital ratios at selected points in time
for the capital-sufficient and capital-deficient groups.
Table2 shows thatthe difference the means ofthe
two groups fell from 2.27 percentage points in 1981 to
just .56percentage points by 1986. the
ence declined each year, mostly due to increases the
capital ratios of the capital-deficientgroup. In fact, the
mean capital ratio of the capital-deficient banks
increased by 2.02 points in comparison to only a .31
point increase for the capital-sufficient banks over the
1981 through 1986 - a statistically significant
differenceof 1.71 points. The apparent riseof points
of the capital-sufficient group, whichtook place mainly
between 1984and 1986, may havebeen due to the .50
point rise in primary for BHCs
assets of$1 billion or more (a characteristic of most of
the capital-sufficient banks in the sample) that became
effective in June of 1985.
Desired Book Capital Ratios
This pattern of gradual adjustment is exactly what
might be expected given that the new regulations were
phased in over the 1982-1985 period and that the 5.5
percent statutory minimum requirement did not become
effective until June of 1985. Because adjustment of
capital iscostly andthus takes places slowly,the actual
average capital ratios over the 1982-1986 period
presented in Table2 may the I0r111I-1CUn
toward which the banks apparently were aiming.
However, by making some assumptions about the
adjustment process, it is to estimate statistically
the follows.
Assuming that a bank has a target capital-to-asset
ratio ofc*and thatin each period it adjusts a fraction,
b, ofthe difference between its actual and target ratio,
the change in the actual capital ratio would be:
(1)
CHART 3
PERCENT OF' BANKS MEET~NG THE 1985



















* The percent ofcapital sufficient banks is less than 100% and the percent ofcapital sufficient banks is greater than zero
in each quarter of1981 because capital sufficiency is defined on an annual basis.
**Banks that met the 1985 requirements in 1981.
*** Banks that did not meet the 1985 requirements in 1981.
8Moving ct _ 1 to the righthand side of equation 1 and
allowingfor other unrelated (random) influencesoncap-
ital ratios, et , gives:
(2)
Equation 2 is used to estimate both the desired or
target capital level, c*, and the speed of adjustment,
b, separately for the capital-deficient and capital-
sufficient banks both before and after the period of
changing capital regulation that began in 1982.
If the new capital regulations had their intended
effects,one wouldexpect the target capital ratios of both
groups of banks to exceed the guidelines during the
post-1982period. Moreover,one would expect the target
capitalratios inthe post-1982period forcapital-deficient
banks not to differ significantly from the target capital
ratios of the capital-sufficient banks.
I)In Table 3, estimates are presented of the model
described by Equation 2. The estimates are from four
pooled-time-series-cross-section nonlinear regressions
for the two periods (before and after 1982) and for the
two groups (capital-deficient and capital-sufficient
banks). The equations are estimated by nonlinear least
squares, and the standard error of each difference is
equal to the square root of the sum of the variances of
the two parameters since the covariances are zero.
The results suggest that capital-deficient banks did
increase their target capital levelsby a statistically sig-
nificant the 1 percent 2.5 percentage
compared to only a .48percentage pointincrease for the
banks for whichthe requirementswerenot binding. (The
.48 point increase for the capital-sufficient banks may
be due to the rise in minimum primary capital require-
ments from 5to 5.5percent in June 1985 for banks with
$1 billion or more in assets.)
Moreover, althoughprior to the imposition of the new
capital standards, the capital-deficientgroup had target
capital ratios 2 percentage points below that of the
capital-sufficient group, during the 1982-1986
there was no statistically significant difference between
the two groups. Thus, the .56 1986
actualcapital ratios shown in Table2appears to be
to incomplete adjustment.
The larger increase in the capital ratios
deficient banks isconsistent with the hypothesis thatthe
newcapital requirements werethe cause ofmost of
significant the
groups suggests that the requirements
eliminate the disparity in actual capital ratios."
The resultsin Table2and 3suggestthat, after the new
regulations became effective, banks' actual and target
book capital ratios on average exceeded the minimum
10required ratio (which was only 5.5 percent). During a
period of explicit minimum requirements such a capi-
tal buffer might be expected for severalreasons." First,
as mentioned previously, regulators expected typical
banks to maintain primary capital ratios somewhat
above the minimum, and they expected banks with
riskier portfolios to maintain capital ratios substantially
above the minimum. Moreover, minimum total capital
required was6 percent and "adequate"total capital was
7 percent, which some banks met by holding primary
capital of 6 percent or more.
Second, capital ratios are not perfectly predictable.
As a result, banks might want to hold a buffer stock to
avoid regulatory penalties should a randomshockcause
them to fall below the required ratio. Third, it may be
costly to raisecapital, at least overa short period. Thus,
banks may want to hold a capital buffer to allow for
unexpected growth opportunities without violating the
capitalguidelines. Finally,bankruptcyandagencycosts
mayprovideanonregulatoryexplanation forwhyat least
some banks would want to hold capitalin excessof the
required amount.
The results in Table3 also suggest that the speed of
adjustment toward target capital levelsincreased sub-
stantially for the capital-sufficient banks (from 3.82to
11.59 percent per quarter) but did not significantly
change for the capital-deficient banks.
One interpretation of these findings is simply that
regulatorsmayhavebecomelesstolerant of capitalratios
below the statutory minimum requirements once they
werein place. Capital-deficient banks, in essence,were
allowed the entire December 1981 through June 1985
period to adjust to the new requirements, whereas
capital-sufficient banks, for the most part, had to meet
the requirements immediately. If this were true, one
would expect the speed of adjustment to increase after
1981, as I found it did for capital-sufficient banks.
However, this same type of increase did not occur for
the group of capital-deficient banks because capital
requirementsfor the multinationals, whichcomprisethe
bulk of this group, wereset in two phases in June 1983
and June 1985.
The Standard Deviation of Book Capital Ratios
One of the goals of the new capital regulations was
moreuniform capital regulations, as reflectedinthe uni-
form minimum 1985 requirements.Iftheserequirements
werea major determinant of capital ratios, one would
expect to seea declinein the dispersion of capital ratios
across banks as all banks aimed to reach capital ratios
near the minimum required level (plus a buffer).
Moreover,sincethe previous results suggestthat cap-
ital regulations had their intended effects of causing
increases in the capital levels of the capital-deficient
banks relative to capital-sufficient banks, one would
expect the standard deviation of capital ratios across all
banks to declineafter uniform minimum standards were
introduced, especially after they had completed their
adjustment to the new minimum requirements. Also,
since the speed of adjustment increased for capital-
sufficient banks, as long as the target ratios of different
banks weresimilar, one might expect a larger decrease
in the standard deviation of their capital ratios than in
those of the capital-deficient banks. The reason isthat
a faster speed of adjustment toward a uniform target
ratio means thatmorebanks willbe near the target ratio
at any time.
Table 4 presents evidence relating to the changes in
the standard deviation of capital ratios across banks for
three groups of banks: 1) all banks in the sample, 2)
capital-deficient banks, and 3)capital-sufficient banks.
First, Icomputedthe standarddeviation of the primary
book capital-to-assetratio across the banks in a partic-
ular group for each quarter. Then I tested whether the
average over time of these cross-sectional standard
deviationsduringthe 1982-1986 periodislowerthanthe
average during the 1975-1981 period.
The results in Table4suggestthatthe mean standard
deviation of the primary capital ratio across all banks
fell from 1.54to 1.16. Moreover, they do not allow the
hypothesis that the standard deviation across capital-
11deficient banks was unchanged to be rejected, whereas
they do indicate that the standard deviation across
capital-sufficient banks declined by a statistically sig-
nificant amount. In addition, the standard deviation
across all banks declined more than the standard devi-
ation of capital-sufficient banks, suggestingthatdiffer-
ences among banksin the two groups also declined - a
result consistent with the intent of the regulations. 10
would the standard deviation of capital
ratios ofthe capital-sufficientgroup ofbanksto exceed
thatofthe capital-deficientgroup before the change in
regulation took place. The reason is that capital-
sufficient banks'capitalratios all exceeded 5.5 percent
and had no upperlimits. However, the capital-deficient
group hadcapital ratios between zero and 5.5 percent.
After the newregulations werepromulgated, one might
expect a tighter clustering of the capital ratios of the
capital-sufficient group around the new target levelif
some of the banks with high capital ratios allowed the
ratios to fallbelowthe minimum. One also wouldexpect
little change in the dispersion ofcapital ratios for banks
thathad an incentiveto operate at the minimum allowed
ratio - apparently a characteristic of many of the
capital-deficient banks.
II. How the Increase Capital Ratios Came
About
The previous results suggest that capital regulation,
in keeping with its stated objectives, did an
fluenceonbookcapital ratios. However, they open
the question ofwhether this result was due to a market-
valuecapital infusion (relativeto assets)or to accounting
gimmicks. As mentioned previously, this issue is
portantbecause the risk-exposureofthe fund
depends on the market value capital-to-asset ratio, not
the book value ratio.
Onecommonly used accounting technique thatwould
boost book capital without a change in market-value
capitalisthe selective of capital gainsthrough
the sale of appreciated thepurchase of other
assets with the proceeds. The difference between
bookandcurrent valuesofthe appreciatedasset would
raise bookcapital andassets eachby the amountofthe
gain, and therebycausethe book capital ratio to increase
even though nothing changed on the bank's market-
value balance sheet.
Another possible method of disguising leverage is
through off-balancesheetbanking. For example,byissu-
ing standby letters ofcredit (SLCs) banks can in effect
fund assets off balance sheet with off-balance
liabilities issued with recourse. Doing so has identical
effectson banks' market valueleverageas funding assets
on their balance sheets.
Thus, it isat leastpossiblethatbanks metthe newcap-
ital standards simply by using accounting techniques,
and that no real change banks' balance sheets
occurred.
Alternatively,banks may haveincreased
to-asset ratios either throughan increasein market value
capital, holding assets constant, or through a decrease
in assets, holding capital constant. Capital may be
increased,holding assetsconstant, either byissuingaddi-
tional equity or by retaining earnings. Assets may be
reduced, holding capitalconstant, byselling assets
using the proceeds to
Perhaps the easiestwayto seehowthe capital-to-asset
ratio can change over time is to differentiate the
of capital, C, to assets, A, with respect to







Equation 3 indicates that the rate of change of
capital-to-asset ratio equals the percentage growth rate
of capital minus the percentage growth rate of assets
times the initial capital-to-asset ratio. Thus, banks can
increase their capital ratios by either increasing capital
growth relative to asset growth or vice versa.Capital and Asset Growth Rates
The data in Table 5 indicate that capital-deficient
banks increased their capital ratios mainly by slowing
assetgrowth. In the table, bothmean annual capital and
asset growth rates (continuously compounded) before
and after the change in regulation were calculated
separately for capital-deficient and capital-sufficient
banks.
Capital-deficient banks their
rate ofasset growth, both relative to their asset growth
rates during the 1975-1981 period and relative to the
growth rates ofcapital-sufficient banks, byalarge (6.44
point)statisticallysignificantamount. Thus, slowerasset
growth appears tobe the main waythatcapital-deficient
banks increased their capital-to-asset ratios relative to
capital-sufficient banks. II
Capital-deficient banks also increased their rate of
capitalgrowth from 9.13to 14.40percent per year. This
increaseappears to besomewhatgreater (.42points) than
the increase in the growth rate capital for capital-
sufficient banks, but the difference is not statistically
significant. Thus, highercapital growth aloneonlypartly
capital-deficient
banks capital-sufficient banks.
One reason thatslowing asset growth may have been
used to increase capital ratios is that the method prob-
ablyinvolves few, if any,transactions costs, and may not
sendthe sametypes of adversesignalsto the capital mar-
ket that are claimed to be associated with new equity
issuance or a reduction in dividend payout rates. 12
Sinceslowerassetgrowth would not result fromselec-
tively realizing capital gains and using the proceeds to
acquire newassets (that would result in more rapid asset
growth), the results suggest, butcertainlydo not prove,
thatthis accounting method does not solelyaccount for
the increased capital-to-asset ratios of the capital-
deficient group of banks relativeto the capital-sufficient
group. Although appreciated assetscould havebeen sold
and used to retire liabilities, thereby overstating the
resultant decrease in book value leverage, such actions
still would reduce market value leverage.13
Off-Balance-Sheet Banking
mentioned above, banks could have evaded the
capital regulations while still slowing asset growth by
shifting existing assets and liabilities offtheir balance
sheets or by funding new assets offbalance sheet with
off-balance-sheet liabilitiesissued with recourse. Loans
sold with recourse and standbyletters ofcredit (SLCs),
for example, havecash flowsidentical to funding loans
on balance sheet no Although loans sold
withrecourseare includedin the balance sheetmeasures,
SLCs are not.
Thus, if the increase in book capital ratios simply
represents shifts of assets andliabilities (with recourse)
off balance sheet, the capital regulations would have
been ineffective. To test for this possibility, I re-
computedcapital ratios as if the loans backed by SLCs
had been funded with on-balance-sheet bankliabilities.
The results are displayed in Table 6.
Table6 showsthat incorporatingSLCsonthe balance
sheet does lowercapital ratios, especiallyfor the capital-
deficient banks. However, there is still an increase in
13average book capitalfrom 4.45 percent in the last quarter
of 1981to 6.06 by the third quarter of 1986 for capital-
deficient banks. Thus, while theincreases in traditional
on-balance-sheet measures of book capital somewhat
overstate thetruebookcapitalincrease (byabout 27per-
cent), consolidated (on-and-off-balance-sheet) book
capital ratios increased for the capital-deficient banks
both absolutely and relative to the capital-sufficient
by a significant amount.
rn. Market-Value Capital
The above results suggest that
the capital regulations, at least in a
deposit insurance were
ing tricks were usedto augment
asset ratios, then, ceteris paribus, one would expect
market-value capital-to-asset ratios to increase one-for-
one with book measures. Thus, thebehaviorofmarket-
value capital ratios also provides
tion on whether the change book camtai-to-asset
ratios was genuine or result ofaccountins changes.
Ideally, one would like to measure
ofeachbankasset (notincluding potentialvalue of
underpriced deposit insurance) and liabilityto compute
the market-value capital-to-asset
such a procedure is not possible because neither detailedbalancesheet datanordataon themarket value of bank
assets are available.
However, it is possible to measure the market value
ofbankequity(price per sharetimes numberofshares).
And, assuming liabilities have par (book) value, the
market value of assets equals thesum of the marketvalue
of equity plus the book value of liabilities. Thus, it is
possibleto computea stock-price-basedmeasureof the
market capital-to-asset ratio.
The problem with this measure, however, is that the
ceteris paribus condition may not hold. Many factors
taxes can
not directly affect the risk
exposure ofthe insurance fund. Nevertheless, changes
in this measure may provide useful information.
4 the means of the equity-based
marketvaluecapital ratios rose rather dramatically for
both capital-deficient and -sufficient banks. However,
unlike theresults for bookcapital ratios, the increase for
capital-deficient banks is not apparently larger.
Table 7, which contains estimates of the mean market
value capital-to-assetratio for thetwo groups ofbanks
at selected points in time, confirms theimpressiongiven
by Chart 4. It shows that market value capital ratios
increased significantly for bothgroups, butif anything,
the increase was larger for thecapital-sufficientgroup.
Thus, unlike theresults for book value capital-to-asset
ratios (in Tables2 and3), capital-deficientbanks did not
experiencea statisticallysignificantlylarger in
their market value capital ratios."
Since themarket value capital ratios ofthe"control"
group rose it
seems likely thatthe condition does not
hold. Thatis, forces otherthanregulationwereinfluenc-
ing equity-basedmeasures ofbanks' market value cap-
ital ratios during the 1982-1986 period.
This raises the question of how to interpret the
increases in market value capital ratios ofthe capital-
deficient group. Werethey theresult ofregulatoryaction






















1975 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986
* Banks that met 1985 requirements in 1981.
**Banks that did not meet 1985 requirements in 1981.
15to all banks? The answer depends on whether the forces
affectingthecapital-sufficientgroup hadsimilar effects
on the capital-deficientgroup. And there are severalrea-
sons they might have haddifferentialeffects, including
1)differential effects of overall stock price and interest
ratetrends on the two groups of banks, and2) differen-
tial changes in regulatory taxes or subsidies.
Stock. Market
Itispossiblethatthe market-value ratios of the capital-
deficient group of banks did rise relative to the capital-
sufficient group once the differential effects of changes
in overall stock price and interest rates are taken into
account. During the post-regulation period, overall
stock pricesrose dramatically and interest rates fell. Both
of these changes are likelyto cause, or to be associated
with factors that would cause, bankstock prices to rise,
and thereby raiseequity-basedmeasures of market-value
capital-to-asset ratios. However, banks' stock prices may
respond differently to such changes due to differences
intheir portfolios' credit and interest rate risk and market
value leverage.
To investigate whether these trends can explain the
cap-
ital ratios, the following test was performed. First, for
the pre-regulatory change period, 1975Q1 through
1981Q4, each bank's market value capital was
regressed on the New YorkStock Exchange Composite
Index, the 20-year Treasury Bondrate, andthe .s-montn
Treasury Billrate. (Also, a dummy wasincluded
16credit control period that affects the second quarter 1980
observation.)Theresulting 103regressions wereused to
forecast each bank's market value capital ratio for each
quarter ofthe post-regulatory period.
meanofthe forecast errors (the actual mar-
ketvaluecapital ratio minus the forecastvalue)wascom-
puted separately for the two groups of banks for each
year. A positive mean forecast error indicates that the
capital ratio rose more than would be expected based
on historicalrelationship betweenthat bank's equity-
based market value capital ratio and overallstock prices
and interest rates.
Ifregulation caused market capital ratios to rise,
larger positive forecast errors for the capital-deficient
group would be expected. That is, capital-deficient
banks' market ratios rise by more than
would be predicted on the basis of the ratios' historical
relationship to overallstock pricesand interest rates,and
also bymore than capital-sufficientbanks'market value
capital ratios would be predicted to rise.
The results ofthis analysis, reported in Table8, lend
little supportto this regulatoryhypothesis. The positive
forecast errors for the capital-deficient group suggest
that some factor other than stock price or interest rate
trends was positively influencing market value capital
ratios, although the effect was not large until 1986.
Consistent with the hypothesis thatregulation wasthe
factor, the forecast errors for the capital-deficientgroup
forthe 1982-1986 periodare somewhat larger thanthose
of the capital-sufficient group. However,the magnitude
of the difference is just .22 points, which sharply con-
trastwith a difference of 1.20points in the rise in book
value capital ratios between thegroups. Moreover,dur-
ing 1986, when one would expect the largest difference
in forecast errors (because oftheeffect ofthe 1985 regu-
lations), the difference between the two groups is not
statistically significant.
In sum, the rise in the market value capital ratios of
capital-deficient banks relative to capital-sufficient
banks isvery small, eventhough controlling for the rise
in rates provides some
support for a relative rise. Moreover, the patternof the
increases does not parallel the differential rise in book
value ratios. Taken as a whole, it does not appear that
differential responsesofcapital-deficientand -sufficient
banks to stock price and interest rate trends provide
strong support for the regulatory hypothesis.
ReguhitorY Subsidies and taxes
Anotherdifficulty in interpreting the behavior of the
equity-based market value capital ratio (using a bank's
equity to measure its market value capital ratio) isthat
a bank's observed equity value can be affected by
changes in regulatory subsidies and taxes.
For example, for a bank with subsidized deposit in-
surance (which underprices risk), an increase in true
capitalofa dollar reducesthe deposit insurancesubsidy
byless thana dollar." Since the decreased value of the
subsidy in turn would be reflected in the bank's stock
price, the total market value of the bank's observed
equity-based capital would rise bylessthana dollar and
the observed market value capital ratio would rise less
than the book ratio. 16
capital-deficient banks received larger capital
infusions and their subsidies fell more than that ofthe
capital-sufficient banks, it is possible that their true
market value capital ratios would have risen more than
those ofthe capital-sufficient banks (even though the
equity-based measures rose by approximately the same
amount).
Changes in asset risk also can alter the value of the
deposit insurance subsidy, which depends positively on
asset risk. I? In particular, if capital-sufficient banks
wereto increase risk, their observed market value capi-
tal could increase even without a true capital infusion.
This result would make it difficult to compare the
changes in market value capital ratios between the two
groups of banks, and thereby determine whether the
capital-deficient banks actually increased capital.
Moreover, changes in relative taxes also can affect
relative market values. For example, if the increase in
capital ratios represented a higher tax for the capital-
deficient group, perhaps because their asset portfolios
weremore heavilyregulated, theirper share stock prices
would be depressed. As a result, the true market capi-
tal ratios ofthe capital-deficientgroup couldhave risen
more, but the observed equity-based measure would not
havereflected the higher value becausethe correspond-
ing rise in regulatory taxes would have depressed per
share stock prices.
Thus, from observedchangesin the stock-price-based
market value capital-to-asset ratio alone, one cannot
determine whether asset risk changed, relative taxes
changed, or capital ratios net ofthe subsidy changed.
This issue is the subject of a companion paper in an
upcoming Review (Furlong, 1988),which presents esti-
mates ofchanges in regulatory subsidies/taxes over the
period for the two groups of banks by estimating the
option value ofdeposit insurance.
In sum, eventhough the changes in stock-price-based
market value capital ratios are consistent with regula-
tory increases in capital for the capital-deficient banks,
theyarealso consistent withseveralotherhypothesesand
thus do not provide independent support for the regula-
tory hypothesis.
17VI. Summary and Conclusions
The evidencepresentedinthis paper stronglysuggests
that uniform capital requirements achieved their
intended effects on book or accounting measures of
banks' capital-to-asset ratios. By 1986, virtually all
banks weremeetingthe book valuecapitalrequirements.
Moreover, the disparity of book capital ratios was
reduced substantially - an effect consistent with the
goals of the capital regulations.
Capital-deficient banks - those originally not meet-
the requirements - increased their capital ratios
primarily by slowing asset growth relative to capital
growth. This suggeststhatthe increasein bookcapital-
to-asset ratios reflecteda true reductioninleverageand
not just an accounting gimmick.
Becauseof a riseinoff-balance-sheetactivity, primar-
ily increased issuance of SLCs, standard book-value
measures of capital ratios somewhat overstate the
increase in capital ratios. However, even if the loans
backed bySLCshad been funded on the balance sheet,
book capital ratios for capital-deficient banks would
have risen substantially over the 1982-1986 period.
Observedmarket valuecapitalratios (basedon banks'
stock prices) did increaseoverall,butthere isno strong
indication of a larger increase for capital-deficient
banks. There are several explanations for this pattern
consistent with a regulatory-induced increase in capi-
tal ratios for the capital-deficient banks. They include
increasedregulatorytaxesorreducedsubsidies,differen-
tial responses to overall stock price and interest rate
changes, and differential changes in bank risk-taking.
Although differential responses to stock price and
interest rate trends do not appear to playa large role,




1. A more recent study by Wall and Peterson (1985) presents
indirectevidencefrom acomplex structural two-regime model
(which assumes that banks' capital ratios are determined either
by regulatory or market forces)that, for the 1982 to 1984 period,
most large BHCs' book value capital-to-asset ratios were
influenced by regulatory forces. However, it appears that these
findings may be very sensitive to model specification and
validity, both of which are untested.
2. Minimum total capital requirements were also set at 5.5per-
cent and 6.5 percent for large and small banks, respectively.
3. Board ofGovernors ofthe Federal Reserve System, Federal
Reserve Bulletin, January 1982, p. 33.
4. 94 percent of the sample of multinationals did not meet the
1985 requirements in 1981, whereas only 10 percent of other
banks inthe sample did not meet the requirements. (Thesample
includes 16 of the 17multinationals. Crocker Bank is excluded
because Compustat does not maintain historical data on
acquired banks.)
5. Board of Governors, op cit.
6. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal
Reserve Bulletin, June 1985, p. 446.
7. An interesting and important research question iswhy book
capital had been declining over so long a period. However,
since the objective of this paper isto analyze the effects of the
1981-1985capital regulations, I restrict the analysis to the 7-year
period, 1975-1981, before the onset of objective capital regula-
tion and the 5-year period, 1982-1986,after. These periods were
chosen partly because capital ratioswere relativelystable during
the 1975-1981 period and partly because more data are
available for this period. Thus, I leave to future research the
question of explaining the generally declining capital ratios
before 1975.
8. I alsoexamined the effectsofthe capital regulations on banks
ranked by their 1981book capital ratios. Estimates ofthe model
similar to that described by equation 2 were obtained for banks
in the lower half and the upper half of both the capital-deficient
and capital-sufficient categories.
As expected, capital-deficient banks in the lower half of the
rankings appeared to increasetheir target ratiosmore than those
in the upper half. Moreover, unlike the pre-regulation period,
there was no statistically significant difference in target levels
during the 1982 through 1986 post-regulation period.
Similarly,those capital-sufficient banks inthe upperhalfof the
rankings may have reduced their target capital ratios (although
not by a statistically significant amount), while those inthe lower
half did increase their target ratios by a statistically significant
amount. Takenas a whole, these results suggestthat all banks
were trying toachieve book capital ratioscloser to a given target
level than in the pre-1982 period.
9. It is unclear whether a capital buffer would exist or even
whether the conceptof a buffer would be meaningful during the
pre-1982 peer group type of capital regulation. If buffers did
exist, it is likely that the target ratio being buffered would vary
among different peer groups.
10. A similar test of whether the uniform capital regulations
caused a decline in the overall standard deviation in capitalratios (both across banks and over time) was also conducted.
The results parallel those in Table 4 and suggest strongly that
standard deviations declined, especially when the 1986period
is compared to the pre-regulation period. As in Table4, there
wasa reduction inthe dispersion ofcapital ratiosamong capital-
sufficient banks as well as a narrowing of differences between
the capital-deficient and -sufficient groups.
11. Another explanation isthat the capital requirements ineffect
represented an increased regulatory tax which, inturn, caused
these banks to shrink. However, since both groups of banks
faced the same capital requirements, it ishard tosee whythese
banks should face a higher regulatory tax than the capital-
sufficient group unless they had much less risky asset portfo-
lios and were constrained by regulators to maintain less risky
portfolios-a hypothesis that seems unlikely, at least in
retrospect.
12. Another reason is that a bank with underpriced deposit
insurance will benefit from increasing asset size while holding
constant the capital-to-asset ratio (see Furlong and Keeley,
1987b).Thus, regulators must impose asset growth restrictions
on such banks to limit the potentialexposure ofthedeposit insur-
ance system. However, the gain from increasing asset size
decreases asthe capital-to-asset ratioincreases. Thus,ifdeposit
insurance were underpriced for this group of banks and if the
stringency of asset size regulation remained unchanged, then
one would expectbanksto meet the new capital requirements
through a decrease in asset growth relative to capital growth
rather than through an increase in capital growth.
Ialso examined the sources of new capital growth. First, there
was an increase in the rate of new equity issuance (scaled by
initialassets)both for banks meeting and those not meeting the
1985 requirements in 1981.
Second, I found that dividend payout rates (as a fraction of
net income before extraordinary items) were basically
unchanged over the period. Moreover, there were no apparent
differences in dividend payout rates between those banks meet-
ing and those not meeting the 1985 requirements in 1981.
Finally,the rate of earnings retention (earnings available for
common minus common dividend payments) scaled by initial
assets was somewhat lower during the 1982-1986 period than
during the 1975-1981 period.
13. It is possible for banks to sell appreciated assets and pay
out part of the capital gains to stockholders and to use the
remainder to boost bank capital. Although the bank's book cap-
ital ratio would rise and book assets would decline, the market
capital ratios would fall. However, there is no strong evidence
of increased payouts, either through dividends or stock repur-
chases to suggest that such a phenomenon occurred.
14. Totest statistically whether the market ratio rose less than
one-for-one with the rise in the book ratio for capital-deficient
banks as Chart 4 suggests, the market-to-book ratio was
regressed on the change in the book capital ratio (using 1981
as a base year) separately for capital-deficient and -sufficient
banks. The hypothesis that an increase in book capital due to
regulationshould resultin a smaller increase in observed equity-
based market capital forcapital-deficient banks than forcapital-
sufficient banks was confirmed.
There isa negative relation between increases in book capi-
tal and the market-to-book ratio for capital-deficient banks. In
contrast, there isa zero,or even a small positive, relationship for
capital-sufficient banks, and the difference in responses was
statistically significant.
15. The reason the subsidy, which isthe current value of a pay-
out from the deposit insurance fund inthe bankruptcy state,falls
by less than one dollar is that even though a dollar of capital
reduces the payout by one dollar (holding asset risk constant)
when bankruptcy occurs, the current value of this one dollar
reduction in the payment is less than one because the prob-
ability of bankruptcy is less than one.
16. Mathematically, the observed market-value capital-to-asset
ratio would be:
Ro = [C + S)/[A + S)
where:
C market capital, not including deposit insurance
A market assets, not including deposit insurance
S market value of deposit insurance
Taking the derivative of Rowith respect to C holding assets, A,
and the risk of assets constant, yields:
dRo/dC = [A(1 + dS/dC) + S - dS/dC]/(A + S)2 >0
17. That is, the observed ratio Ro(see footnote 16) increases
because:
dRo/ds = [(A + SYdS/ds - (C + S)dS/ds)/(A + Sf >0.
s = standard deviation of return on assets,
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